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Sentence disparity has for some time been the object of considerable comment and discussion. The author reviews the philosophy and
suggests that disparity in sentences may have counter-productive consequences. Mr. Morgan examines the Wyoming criminal justice system
for evidence of disparity and propounds and discusses a variety of
remedial alternatives.

DISPARITY AND THE SENTENCING
PROCESS IN WYOMING DISTRICT COURTS:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE
J. Michael Morgan*

S

Courts, in the sentencing of convicted persons,
must be something other than mechanical instruments of punishment. The symbolic blindfold on the
statue of Justice was never intended to obscure from
the sight of the judge an understanding of the
human being who stands before him awaiting judgment. The quality of sentencing must concern us
no less than the quality of the entire judicial process
which precedes it. 1

and in particular the problem of sentence
disparity, has recently become a focal point of discussions
concerning the judicial process. Critical comments concerning sentencing disparity have come from virtually every segment of the criminal justice system, and the society in which
it functions.' Judges themselves have come to the fore in
ENTENCING,

CopyrightO 1976 by the University of Wyoming
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1. Levin, Toward a More Enlightened Sentencing Procedure, 45 NFn. L. REV.
499, 509 (1966).
2. President Ford, in his message to the Congress of the United States on
June 19, 1975, decried federal sentencing laws and procedures which allowed
"widely varying sentences" for defendants who have committed similar
offenses. He stated that this lack of uniformity "is profoundly unfair and
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criticizing sentencing as a "dubious process", which has
resulted in "law without order or limit."'
The sentencing issue is aggravated by the marked contrast between the panoply of rights in which the defendant
is robed for the guilt determination process and the nakedness with which he must stand to face his sentencing.4 No
trial would be had without the advantages of tight procedural
and evidentiary rules, and the availability of appellate review
designed to detect the most minute error. Yet, sentencing is
conducted with little semblance of either. The irony of this
contrast is intensified when it is considered that the majority
of criminal convictions are obtained by guilty pleas which
bypass the process of guilt determination entirely. In some
jurisdictions, 86 percent of convictions are obtained by plea
of guilty5 while in Wyoming the figure approaches a substantial 75 percent.' For these defendants, the severity of the
punishment to be imposed is the only issue. Yet sole responsibility for sentence determination is delegated to a single
judge.' This results in the greatest degree of uncontrolled
breeds disrespect for the law." PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, COMBATING CRIME
IN THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doe. No. 191, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
3. Frankel, quoted in Korbakes, Criminal Sentencing: Is the "Judge's Sound
Discretion" Subject to Review? 59 JUDICATURE 112 (1975).
4. Note, Due Process and Legislative Standards in Sentencing, 101 U. PA. L.
REY. 257, 263 (1952).
5. Eighty-six percent of those convicted in federal district courts in 1971
pleaded guilty initially or changed their plea to guilty. ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED
STATES

6.

CouRTs--1971, 6 (1973).

CRIMGOVERNOR'S PLANNING COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL ADMINISTRATION,
INAL JUSTICE SYSTEM DATA BOOK, vol. II, WYOMING COMPREHENSIVE LAW

ENFORCEMENT PLAN-1972 AND 1973. The regular yearly survey of district
courts conducted by the Governor's Planning Committee on Criminal
Administration revealed that for the year 1972, 72 percent of those
convicted of a felony pleaded guilty. The 1973 figure was 64 percent.
However, a special District Court Offense and Disposition Survey for 1973
indicated that 88 percent pleaded guilty. The difference in figures may be
a result of a failure in the regular 1973 survey to take into consideration
defendants who originally pleaded not guilty but who changed their plea
to guilty before trial.
7. In addressing those jurisdictions in which the vast majority of criminal
convictions are obtained by guilty pleas, the ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS

FOR CRIMINAL

JUSTICE,

STANDARDS

RELATING

TO

APPELLATE

REVIEW OF SENTENCES 1-2 (Approved Draft 1967), comments:

It is not an overstatement to say of these jurisdictions that in no
other area of our law does one man exercise such unrestricted
power. No other country in the free world permits this condition
to exist.
See also the remarks of Judge Sobeloff in Appellate Review of Sentences,
A Sy mposium at the Judicial Conference of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, 32 F.R.D. 249, 265 (1962).
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power over the lives and liberty of men that can be found
in our legal system.'
This article will examine disparity in sentencing and
its consequences. Wyoming's sentencing laws and practices
will be reviewed to determine if, and to what extent, disparity
is a problem. Alternative remedies will be proposed.'
The focus will be on the courts, although it should be
understood that whether a person comes before the sentencing
judge at all depends upon what may have been discretionary
decisions made by arresting officers,"0 the prosecuting attorney,1 ' and the grand and petit juries. It should also be recognized that discretion as to the ultimate length of incarceration is also vested in the Board of Probation and Parole'
and the executive.'"
OBJECTIVES OF SENTENCING

The imposition of sentences is an important mechanism
through which society attempts to achieve its objectives. The
difficulty lies in the fact that there is little agreement as
to what those objectives are, or the best way to attain them.
8. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Process,
75 HA v. L. REv. 904 (1962).
9. An interesting area which will not be directly discussed is disparity in
sentencing brought about or influenced by the manner in which convictions
are obtained. FEDERAL OFFENDERS, supra note 5, at 55, reports average
sentence weights by the manner in which convictions were obtained. See
note 30, infra, for a discussion of how average sentence weights are obtained.
AVERAGE SENTENCE WEIGHT

Plea of Guilty
Plea of Not Guilty
Convicted By:
Average
at Arraignment
Changed to Guilty
Court
Jury
Total
4.7
6.6
6.3
13.5
6.1
Although these figures are not controlled for factors which may meaningfully affect them, the variance holds true for all classes of offense. They
raise a serious question as to the effect which the manner of conviction has
upon sentences and the weight which penitence has upon the sentencing
process. See note 21, infra, for discussion of the penitence theory in
sentencing.

10. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, REPORT ON POLICE 22-23 (1973).
Referring to law enforcement
officers as "among the most important decision makers in society," the
report calls for well defined limits for officer discretion.
11. As to juveniles, see WYo. STAT. § 14-115.12 (Supp. 1975). Although there
is no explicit statutory language authorizing discretion for prosecutors in
nonjuvenile cases, it is widely recognized that it is exercised. NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT

ON COURTS 24 (1973).
12. WYO. STAT. § 7-325 (Supp. 1975).
13. WYO. CONST. art. 4. § 5.
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The perspective and background which each individual actor
in the process brings to bear adds emotional elements which
may color his judgment regarding what is to be sought. The
victim may want revenge, the offender's wife leniency, the
prosecuting attorney punishment, and the law enforcement
officer a stern example to others. 4
The generally perceived goal of the sentencing process
is the protection of society. The objectives which may be
used in achieving that goal are many, and their relative
importance has been, and is, and no doubt will continue to
be, debated. Although there is a rational basis for seeking
each, the objectives also appear to correspond roughly to the
various emotions which the actors have brought to the sentencing process. These objectives are generally perceived
to be:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Deterrence to the offender (special deterrence).
Deterrence to others (general deterrence).
Incapacitation.
Rehabilitation.
Punishment.

The concept of sentencing as a special deterrent is based
upon the assumption that the imposition of a penalty upon
the offender before the court will cause him to refrain from
committing future crimes through fear of additional punishment. If this objective has indeed been sought in the sentencing process, recidivism rates would suggest that its basic
assumption is at best only partially valid.
General deterrence is the attempt to impose a sentence
in the case at hand which is of such a nature that potential
offenders in the general public will refrain from committing
crimes through fear of punishment and social condemnation. 5
Recent studies tend to confirm the effectiveness of general
deterrence and cast doubt upon the common assertion that
the crime rate is unrelated to the reactions of the criminal
14. Coburn, Disparity in Sentences and Appellate Review of Sentencing, 25
RTurnms L. Rnv. 207, 208 (1971).
15. Andenaes, General Prevention Re visited: Research. and Policy Implications,
66 J. CRIM. L. & C. 338, 341 (1975).
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justice system.1" As a measure of the deterrent effect of
certainty of punishment, these studies compared crime rates
with the ratio of the number of persons imprisoned for a
specific offense over the number of offenses reported to law
enforcement authorities." Also compared was the median
number of months being served for particular offenses with
the number of those offenses reported to law enforcement
agencies, to indicate the deterrent effect of sentence severity.
While the results indicated that imprisonment itself
acts as a deterrent to crime, the difference in the length of
imprisonment at the levels of use in those state courts did
not seem to have a significant impact. 8 These results indicate
that sentencing to accomplish general deterrence is valid only
as to the decision to incarcerate.
It would appear that incapacitation is the most easily
obtained objective. It represents an attempt to protect society
for a period of time by removing the offender from the community. Complete attainment of this goal through this objective can be accomplished only by the imposition of extremely
long periods of incarceration. The average offender who is
returned to the community after a relatively short period of
confinement may pose a greater risk to society than he who
has never been incarcerated. This possibility represents a
severe limitation on the number and type of sentences which
should be imposed with incapacitation in mind.
While the offender is in custody, the state should make
every effort to change his attitudes and improve his skills
and capabilities so that he may cope with life in a free society
without committing criminal acts. Although few will dis16. Few criminals believe that they will be caught. Without this belief, the
nature or severity of the potential punishment cannot be a factor in the
criminal's thinking at the time of the commission of the offense. In only
a few cases is the criminal even aware before the offense of the nature, scope
or severity of possible punishment. The rare exception to these principles
is the criminal who seeks punishment for himself or his family. Seagraves,
Is Punishment an Adequate Deterrent to Crime? 55 JUDICATURE 236, 237
(1972).
17. Gibbs, Crime, Punishment and Deterrence, 48 SOc. ScI. Q. 515 (1968);
Logan, General Deter'rent Effects of Imprisonmeent, 51 SOCIAL FORCES 64
(19n74).
18. Andenaes, supra note 15, at 347.
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agree with this stated rehabilitation concept, fewer still will
agree that correctional systems have succeeded in their
attempts to rehabilitate." Although sentencing for rehabilitative purposes does achieve success for a certain number of
defendants, it should not be expected that it can be, or is,
accomplished in the majority of cases.
Every sentence is a restraint upon the offender and
thus represents punishment to some degree. Sentences imposed to effect punishment 2° as an objective attempt to place
a just sanction on the offender, in the sense of being in
proportion to the severity of the crime and his culpability,
regardless of whether such a penalty is likely to prevent
further crime in the offender or others. This may tend to
affect the offender by psychologically cleansing him through
the feeling that penitence has been done. 1 Sentencing as
punishment may also satisfy, at least partially, the retributive impulses of the community against the offender. In this
way, the criminal justice system may replace lynch mobs
and tar and feather parties and seeks to satisfy the psychological needs which prompted them to flourish before the
criminal justice system came to be relied upon.22 Although
retribution may be inconsistent with the current rehabilitation model, it may, as a practical matter, fulfill these basic
human needs of the community and the offender.
The application of these objectives has been affected
by trends. Traditional sentencing theory applied these objecIt has been hypothesized that there is little difference in recidivism based
on differences in corrections methods imposed. In other words, of the
offenders who do not repeat their offenses after a given type of sentence,
most would have reacted similarly to most other types of sentences as well.
However, this is not really surprising since rehabilitative treatment in
penal institutions generally consists of little more than variations in the
conditions of custody and since probation rarely involves more than cursory
supervision. Morris & Hawkins, Rehabilitation: Rhetoric and Reality, 34
FED. PROBATION, 9-11 (Dec. 1970).
20. It would appear that the Wyoming Constitution prohibits the imposition
of a criminal sentence for purposes of retribution. "Penal Code to be
Hurnae.-The penal code shall be framed on the humane principles of
reformation and prevention." WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 15.
21. Penitence may be considered as a separate objective of sentencing, or as
a concommitant of retribution. The idea came to prominence in the 19th
Century and never attained great popularity except in the United States.
The philosophy behind penitence is that incarceration gives the criminal an
opportunity to reflect on and contemplate the enormity of his crime. This
leads to spiritual regeneratiin and hence rehabilitation. WILLIAMS, THE
LAW OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTION 57 (1974).
22. Id. at 24.

19.
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tives by focusing on the crime rather than the offender. The
objectives of incapacitation and punishment were applied by
judges who were satisfied with reacting to past deviant
behavior. Penalties were fixed and mechanically applied to
fit the crime. Modern theory represents a moral commitment
to the worth of the individual -" by attempting to fit the
sentence to the offender as well as to the crime. Rehabilitation and deterrence are sought in an attempt to control the
future behavior of both the offender and others.
This rehabilitative treatment-oriented ideology is, and
has been, the predominant theory in corrections for the better
part of this century. 4 The fact that it is currently in vogue
does not suggest that it has been legally imposed or is uniformly applied. State legislatures have generally failed to
mandate which objective or objectives should be applied for
various classes of offenses. This may be due to the fact that
while criminologists have embraced the treatment-oriented
ideology, society itself is still deeply divided and unable to
reach a consensus.
With the legislatures standing silent, it is tacitly left
to the courts to determine the applicable objectives. But the
courts are not a monolithic body. The sentencing power is
exercised through individual judges who often are as deeply
divided on the issue as is society. These individual jurists
are condemned to select objectives without the benefit of
legislative or judicial policy, and the objective selected should,
and does, influence the sanction imposed. 5
23. Kadish, aupra note 8.
24. Andenaes, supra note 15, at 339.
25. HOGARTH, SENTENCING AS A HUMAN PouasS 71 (1971). In a study conducted by the author, 71 full time magistrates in the Province of Ontario
were interviewed. Sixty-five out of the 71 believed their role to be the
prevention of crime through sentencing. As the chart below indicates,
they differed widely in the way they attempted to achieve their purpose.
IMPORTANCE GIVEN BY MAGISTRATES TO THE CLASSICAL PURPOSES IN

Very
Importance
Reformation
General
deterrence
Individual
deterrence
Incapacitation
Punishment

Quite
Importance

Some
Importance

Little
Importance

SENTENCING

No
Importance
-

39

7

16

6

26

4

10

27

1

16
9

8
8
3

11
21
8

22
28
36

3
2
14
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Without established policies, the objectives chosen may
become personal to the judge. There is no requirement that
controlling sentencing objectives be enunciated, 6 and the
judge's goals in patterning a sentence are committed only
to personal memory. 7 In such a system, objectives themselves may take a diminished role. Sentences may tend to
be fashioned by individual judicial characteristics rather
than established policy,2" and disparity finds a fertile plot
in which to exist.
DISPARITY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Disparity exists. There is no need to qualify that statement, and few will disagree with it. Instances of unjustified
disparity are common and have been repeatedly demonstrated.29 The federal courts serve as outstanding examples
due to the volume of detailed statistical information which
is collected annually by the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts. The Office has developed a system of
average and comparative sentence weights which accurately
reflect variance in sentencing in the different United States
judicial districts."0

26.
27.

28.
29.
30.

See also ORLAND & TYLER, JusTicE IN SENTENCING (1974). The authors
discuss a study comparing rehabilitatively oriented juvenile court judges
with those who were punitively oriented. It was found that the rehabilitatively oriented judges almost always imposed longer periods of incarceration than did their punitively oriented brethren.
United States v. Velazquez, 482 F.2d 139 (2nd Cir. 1973).
Although the Board of Parole must take into consideration the judge's
comments and recommendations, the judge is in no way required to make
them. The Rules and Regulations, Board of Parole, State of Wyoming,
ch. 5, § 3 (1974), states that the Board in determining whether to grant
parole must take into consideration "the purposes of the sentence." However, it appears that the Board must make an independent judgment as
to what that purpose is. With reference to the purpose of the sentence,
"the Board shall recognize that sentence is usually imposed for one or more
of the following purposes: rehabilitation, punishment, example to others
and to remove from society." (emphasis added).
Note, AppeUate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions: A Connecticut
Case Study, 69 YALE L. J. 1453, 1458 (1960).
Harries & Lura, The Geography of Justice: Sentencing Variation in U.S.
Districts, 57 JUDICATURE 392 (1974).
Id. at 393. In this system, developed in 1964, sentence weights range from
zero for suspended sentences and probation without supervision to 50 for
prison sentences over 120 months. The comparative sentence weight is a
mathematical expectancy based on the national average weight value
obtained for each of nine offense classes as applied to the number of
defendants in the individual offense classes for the individual district.
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Under this weighting system, the average comparative
sentence weight was 6.1 for all United States district courts
in 1971. This fluctuated in individual judicial districts from
highs of 12.1 in Puerto Rico and 10.2 in western Washington
to lows of 3.5 in southern Texas and 3.8 in western Texas."
Wyoming was slightly above average with a weight of 6.7.
These figures indicate that while the "average" defendant
in one jurisdiction may expect a sentence of four years imprisonment, in another jurisdiction probation or a sentence
of one to six months would probably be imposed for conviction
of the same crime.
This fluctuation continues when the use of probation
is considered. The comparative use of probation, 2 expressed
as a percentage, varied from a low of 41.8 in Puerto Rico to
66.5 in southern Georgia. These figures represent actual
percentages of individuals placed on probration of 31.5 and
82.9, respectively.
These statistics are as accurate as modern practices can
provide. However, statistics can never accurately portray
the personal tragedy and manifest injustice which is worked
by sentence disparity. One must consider the effects upon
the offender, his family, and the effectiveness of the criminal
justice system itself, caused by disparity such as that which
James V. Bennett, former Director of the Federal Bureau
of Prisons, describes:
The first man had been convicted of cashing a check
for $58.40. He was out of work at the time of his
offense, and when his wife became ill, and he needed
money for rent, food and doctor bills, he became
the victim of temptation. He had no prior criminal
record. The other man cashed a check for $35.20.
31. Id. A weight of 12.1 would indicate an average sentence slightly in excess
of maximum sentences of between 37 and 48 months. A comparative sentence weight of 3.5 indicates an average sentence of silghtly over one to
six months or probation in excess of 13 to 36 months.
32. The "comparative use of probation" is a mathematical expectancy. It is
based on the application of the national average use of probation for eight
offense classes to the actual offenses of defendants sentenced in separate
United States district courts. It is an expected statistical probability and
does not take into account the differences among defendants as to age,
prior criminal record or other significant factors. FEDERAL OFFENDERS,
supra note 5, at 115.
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He was also out of work, and his wife had just left
him for another man. His prior record consisted
of a drunk charge and a non-support charge. Our
examination of these two cases indicated no significant difference for sentencing purposes. But they
appeared before different judges, and the first man
received fifteen years in prison, and the second man
received thirty days."
Similar disparity has been found to exist in state judicial
systems." The procedural climate in which sentencing occurs
in Wyoming is just as permissive of disparity as that of the
federal jurisdictions. The statutory structure provides only
limited safeguards against unsubstantiated differentiation
and is similar to the statutory schemes found in jurisdictions
in which disparity has been documented.
The range of available sentences itself adds to this
possibility. The records of the Wyoming State Penitentiary
indicate that of those prisoners incarcerated during the fall
of 1974 for burglary, 5 the sentences ranged from 12 to 13
months to 10 to 14 years. The most common sentence was
12 to 13 months which was imposed 12 times-nine times
from the same judicial district. Of the 46 sentences being
served, 21 were of differing terms. Thirty-five sentences
for the uttering of fraudulent checks 6 ranged from a low
of 12 to 13 months to a most severe sentence of four to five
years. The most common sentence was 12 to 13 months, which
occurred 10 times, nine of which were from the same judicial
Bennett, Countdown for Judicial Sentencing, 25 FED. PROBATION 24 (Sept.
1961).
34. A study of sentencing variances of six New Jersey judges revealed shocking disparity. Jail sentences were given in 57.7 percent of the cases when
Judge #4 presided and only 33.6 percent of the cases when Judge #2
presided. Judge #6 gave only 15.7 percent of his sentences in the form of
suspended sentences, while Judge #2 gave 33.8 percent in that form. No
general increase or decrease in the severity of the sentencing tendencies
was found to exist as the judges gained experience. Gaudet, St. John &
Harris, Individual Differences in the Sentencing Tendencies of Judges, 23
J. CRIM. L. & C. 811 (1933).
35. WYO. STAT. § 6-129 (1957).
36. Wyo. STAT. § 6-39 (Supp. 1975). The 1973 amendment to the statute
reduced the maximum penalty from five years and a $5,000 fine to one
year in the county jail and a $100 fine.
33.
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district. Of the 35 sentences for this offense, 12 were of
differing sentence terms."
It is interesting to note that the same judicial district
was responsible for the high occurrence of minimum sentences in both instances. That district's" average sentence
to the penitentiary for fraudulent checks was one year, four
months, to a maximum of one year, nine months, for the 13
sentences in the sample. Another judicial district," with a
sample of 18 sentences, averaged sentences of one year, four
months, to a maximum of three years, two months, for the
same statutory offense.
When comparing these two judicial districts for sentences for burglary, the disparity becomes more pronounced.
The former averaged sentences of one year, eight months,
to a maximum of two years, four months, for 15 cases, while
the latter averaged two years, eight months, to a maximum of
five years, nine months, for 12 cases. A third district "
averaged four years, one month, to a maximum of five years,
one month, in a sample of six cases.
As indicated by the chart below, a similar variance
was found to exist for grand larceny offenses as well. The
former district had 24 cases in the sample for grand larceny,"'
for which the average term imposed was one and one-half
years to two years, one month. The latter district was again
high, imposing an average sentence of one and one-half
years to three and one-half years, in a sample of 11 cases.
37. This type of presentation can continue. For instance, those incarcerated
during the period surveyed for violation of breaking and entering, Wyo.
STAT. § 6-130 (195), numbered 32, of which there were 20 differing terms
of incarceration. The sentence ranged from one year, one day, to seven
years and seven days with the most common sentence being 12 to 13 months.
38. The Second Judicial District which encompasses Albany, Carbon and
Sweetwater counties.
39. The Seventh Judicial District which encompasses Natrona, Converse and
Fremont counties.
40. The Fifth Judicial District which encompasses Park, Hot Springs, Big
Horn and Washakie counties.
41. WYo. STAT. § 6-132 (Supp. 1975).
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CURRENT AVERAGE SENTENCES OF IMPRISONMENT
EXPRESSED IN MONTHS FOR SELECTED OFFENSES AS
IMPOSED IN WYOMING JUDICIAL DISTRICTS*
Offense
Burglary
Fraudulent Checks
Grand Larceny

Second
20-28 (15)
16-21 (13)
18-25 (24)

JudicialDistrict
Seventh
32-69 (12)
16-38 (18)
18-42 (11)

Fifth
37-61 (6)
....

*Number of cases in each sample shown in parentheses.

The small sample in each category makes the drawing
of firm conclusions from the data impossible. Information
was collected on eight offense categories, only three of which
produced sufficient data to make any presentation possible,
and then only when comparing three judicial districts.
Important factors, such as the relative use of probation
and the characteristics of the average offender in each judicial district, were not controlled. Even though firm conclusions cannot be drawn, the fact remains that for all three
categories containing the largest samples, sentences were
markedly more severe in one judicial district than in another.
If it is assumed that the aforementioned factors are indeed
constant throughout the various judicial districts, the presence of disparity in the system may be presumed.
Additional examples of possible disparity can be drawn
from individual cases within the three judicial districts.
While it is almost impossible to take into consideration all
of the factors which go into any judicial sentencing decision
and objectively compare them with another apparently similar situation, there are certain cases which raise questions
as to the justice dispensed in each instance.
In one such comparison, Defendant A, a 25 year old
man, pleaded guilty to delivery of a controlled substance,42
marijuana and amphetamines, on two different occasions.
Defendant A was a life long resident of the community and
came from a stable family which, composed of his mother,
father and a married sister, was still residing there. He was
42. Wyo.

STAT.

§ 35-347.31 (a) (Supp. 1975).
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divorced and had two children in the custody of their mother.
No record of prior offenses could be found. After graduation
from high school, he had worked six years as a heavy equipment operator until a job-related accident mangled his arm
and forced him to quit work and undergo therapy. His presentence investigation recommended probation.
Defendant B, a 23 year old man, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, marijuana,
amphetamines and LSD, in violation of the same statute. He
had been living in the community a little over one year, held
a steady job, and was separated from his wife, who had
custody of their two children. When convicted of possession
of a controlled substance" the previous year, he had been
placed on probation, which was in effect at the time of the
commission of the present offense. The pre-sentence report
cautioned against probation.
Defendant A received a sentence of three to seven years
in the penitentiary as an example to others," while Defendant
B served 30 days in the county jail and was continued on
probation for six months.
It would not be difficult to survey various jurisdictions
and cull from their dockets sentence variations for the same
statutory offense. This would only serve to indicate that
the various jurisdictions are served by differing criminal
laws and that individual offenders possess different relevant
characterstics. The lack of exact uniformity is necessary if
sentences are to be based at least in part on relevant differences in offenders and the severity of their offenses.
Statutory definitions of crimes are usually broad enough
to allow the statute to encompass crimes of varying severity
for which different sentences may be warranted. Aggravating and mitigating factors should, and usually are, taken into
consideration." Therefore, mere variation in the sentences
43. WYo. STAT. § 35-347.31 (c) (Supp. 1975).
44. This sentence was later reduced to one to two years on motion of the
defendant's counsel.
45. Williams, supra note 21, lists the following as factors which should be
taken into consideration:
A. The nature and circumstances of the offense.
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imposed for a particular statutory crime does not indicate
the presence of sentence disparity in the system. Disparity
exists only when there is variance in sentences for the same
statutory offense, and that variance is unrelated to the
consideration of appropriate aggravating and mitigating
circumstances."
EFFECTS OF DISPARITY

Disparity may detract from the objectives of the criminal
justice system by promoting disrespect for law and by lowering public confidence in the ability of the courts to deal
justly with those who come before them. In larger jurisdictions consistent differences in sentence severity between
judges promote delay by encouraging attempts to have cases
tried before judges known to be more lenient. 7 Thus, the
process of "judge shopping"" s becomes common and terms
such as "bargain basement justice" creep into the vocabulary.
Unjustified disparity also adversely effects the corrections process. Prisoners compare their sentences. 9 If,
through this comparison, they are convinced that they have
been dealt with unfairly, they may become hostile and resist
correctional treatment and discipline. These same prisoners
may leave the institution embittered, substantially increasing
the chances of recidivism."° One distinguished commentator
asserts that if rehabilitation is, in fact, a goal of the criminal
justice system, then "the cultivation of a sense of fairdealing
The circumstances of the offender.
The age of the offender.
Family background.
Social adjustment (as measured by education, employment, group activities, responsibility, management of money, etc.).
F. Previous criminal record.
G. Marital status.
Id. at 24. See also REPORT ON COURTS, supra note 11, at 23.
In many jurisdictions this is accomplished by the requesting of continuances
by defense counsel who hope that the rescheduling will bring their client's
case before a more lenient judge. In Wyoming, where multi-judge courts
are not the rule, the more direct procedure of "swearing off" a judge
is used via WYO. R. CraM. P. 23.
Subin, Administration of Justice in the Recorder's Court of Detroit, in
REPORT ON COURTS, supra note 11, at 136.
Hosner, Group Procedures in Sentencing: A Decade of Practice, 34 F).
PROBATION 19 (Dec. 1970).
See id. In addition to the effect on prisoner morale and attitude, disparity
adversely affects the attitude of their families and makes the rehabilitation
process more difficult for all concerned.
B.
C.
D.
E.

46.
47.

48.
49.
50.
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in the offender would appear itself to be helpful, if not essential in attaining that avowed goal..."."
SAFEGUARDS

As long as the human element is present in the sentencing process, some disparity in sentencing will exist. The
concept of individualization of sentences which is now in
vogue demands a multitude of options which judges may
apply in tailoring the individual sanctions for offenders convicted of the same offense. However, to be effective, this
philosophy does not require the total absence of safeguards.
An examination of safeguards which have been implemented
in other jurisdictions indicates that disparity can be reduced
without lessening the effectiveness of, or substantially inconveniencing, the judicial and correctional systems.
A. Statutory Reform
Possible sentences should fit the crime for which they
are imposed by reflecting society's perception of the harm
which the offense causes. Upon examination, it would appear
that this is not always the case. Sanctions available for
differing offenses are often without rational basis. For
instance, if a person unlawfully enters an automobile for
the purpose of removing a tape deck, it is punishable by a
maximum term of 14 years under Wyoming law. 2 However,
stealing the entire automobile, tape deck and all, carries a
A man
maximum sentence of 10 years imprisonment.
engaging in voluntary sexual intercourse with a 14 year old
female is subject to a penitentiary term of 50 years. 4 If the
same man maliciously assaulted her with a double-edged
axe,55 cut off one or several of her limbs, "6 or even administered poison with intent to kill her," he could only receive a
14 year sentence.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Kadish, supra
Wyo. STAT. §
WYO. STAT. §
WYo. STAT. §
Wyo. STAT. §

56.

WYO. STAT. § 6-2 (1957).
Wyo. STAT. § 6-73 (1957).

57.

note 8, at 928.
6-129 (1957).
6-132 (Supp. 1976).
6-63 (B) (Supp. 1975).

6-70 (B) (Supp. 1975).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1976

15

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 11 [1976], Iss. 2, Art. 7

540

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XI

. It appears then that statutory reform, insofar as it
affects sentencing, must begin with the substantive law itself.
Wyoming substantive law is largely a result of piecemeal
construction. This manifests itself in available sanctions
which are not rationally based in comparison with sanctions
for other offenses, as demonstrated above, and in a ballooning number of legislatively imposed terms of incarceration.
Felony statutes provide for 10 different maximum terms and
17 different ranges of possible incarceration." This is not
to mention the possible range of fines, narrow as it may be, "
probation, or combinations thereof, which may be imposed.
It would appear that given the large number of differing
sentences, it is somewhat beyond the capability of any legislature to match them with the injury to society which the
offense causes, and the needs of the community and of the
offender in the correctional system.
Most studies of the problem have recommended that
categories of offenses be established with each statutory
58. Examples of these 17 different felony sentences are: Wyo. STAT. § 6-124
(1957) arson in the fourth degree (one to two years) ; § 6-123 (1957) arson
in the third degree (one to three years) ; § 6-125 (1957) arson to defraud
insurer (one to five years); § 6-100 (Supp. 1975) mutilation of dead
human bodies (two to five years); § 6-122 (1957) arson in the second
degree (one to ten years); § 6-65 (1957) robbery (one to 14 years); § 6-18
(1957) forging public securities (one to 15 years); § 6-139 (1957) embezzlement by attorney (one to 20 years); § 6-121 (1957) arson in the first
degree (two to 20 years); § 6-136 (1957) embezzlement of public funds
(one to 21 years) ; § 6-63(B) (Supp. 19.75) rape in the second degree (one
to 50 years); § 6-9 (Supp. 1975) habitual criminal-three convictions of
a felony (ten to 50 years); § 6-63(A) (Supp. 1975) first degree rape (one
year to life); § 6-55 (1957) murder in the second degree (20 years to
life); § 6-10 (Supp. 1975) habitual criminal-four convictions of a felony
(life imprisonment); § 6-54 (Supp. 1975) murder in the first degree
(under certain circumstances) (death).
59. See Wyo. STAT. § 6-6 (1957), which provides that a fine of $1,000 may be
assessed as part of punishment for any felony. The ALI, MODEL PENAL
CODE (Proposed Off. Draft 1962) [hereinafter cited as MODEL PENAL
CODE], provides for a wider range of possible fines:
§ 6.03. Fines. A person who has been convicted of an offense may
be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding:
(1) $10,000, when the conviction is a felony of the first or second
degree;
(2) $5,000, when the conviction is of a felony of the third degree;
(3) $1,000 when the conviction is of a misdemeanor;
(4) $500, when the conviction is of a petty misdemeanor or a
violation;
(5) any higher amount equal to double the pecuniary gain derived
from the offense by the offender;
(6) any higher amount specifically authorized by statute.
60.

MODEL PENAL CODE

§§ 6.01,

6.06;

ADVISORY

COUNCIL OF JUDGES OF THE

NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING ACT
§§ 5-9 (1963); ABA STANDARDS--SENTENCING

URES, Standard 2.1(a)

ALTERNATIVES AND PROCED-

(Approved draft 1968).
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crime being classified according to its severity.61 When certain prescribed criteria are met,62 a separate, extended sentence schedule may be utilized for more serious offenses."
In this way, some consistency can be maintained between
sentence weight and severity of the offense.
In accord with the model acts, Wyoming statutes provide
for the imposition of indeterminate as opposed to straight
sentences for felony convictions." Indeterminate sentences
in Wyoming fix maximum and minimum sentence limits
within which judges must determine the offender's maximum
and minimum term of imprisonment." The sentencing
judge"6 may impose definite terms only when sentencing to
the county jail, or to the penitentiary for life. Although all
the model acts advocate the use of the indeterminate sentence,
61. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.06 (Alternate).
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCE

OF IMPRISONMENT FOR FELONY

Ordinary Terms

Grade of Felony
First Degree
Second Degree
Third Degree

Minimum

Maximum

1 to 10 years
1 to 3 years
1 to 2 years

20 years to life
10 years
5 years

62. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.03. The court many sentence under the extended
term schedule when it finds that it is necessary for the protection of the
public, and that the defendant is a professional criminal, persistent
offender, or a dangerous, mentally abnormal person. The section contains
preliminary findings which may be made before the schedule can be used.
63. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.07.
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT FOR FELONY

Extended Terms

Grade of Felony
First Degree
Second Degree
Third Degree

Minimum
5 to 10 years
1 to 5 years
1 to 3 years

Maximum
Life imprisonment
10 to 20 years
5 to 10 years

The sentence which is statutorily authorized for any particular criminal
offense determines whether violation of that statute constitutes a felony
or a misdemeanor. Those crimes which are punishable by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary are felonies; all other offenses are misdemeanors.
WYo. STAT. § 6-2 (1957). The minimum term of imprisonment in the penitentiary is one year. WYO. STAT. § 6-6 (1957).
65. WYO. STAT. § 7-313 (1957).
66. Sentencing by the trial judge rather than the jury is sanctioned by the
MODEL SENTENCING ACT, supra note 60; MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.02;
REPORT ON COURTS, supra note 11, Standard 5.1; and the ABA STANDARDSSENTENCING ALTERNATIVES, supra note 60, § 1.1.
The ABA STANDARDS state one rationale, at page 45:
Sentencing by a . . . jury at each trial is necessarily a guarantee
of significant disparity between sentences. A . . . jury is to
sentence only once, and . . . can hardly be expected to impose a
sentence which is consistent in principle with sentences imposed by
other equally disadvantaged juries.
In addition, the ABA STANDARDS take into account that much of the material
64.
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that use is their only common denominator; the manner of
imposition varies. 7
Mandatory terms statutorily remove the judge's discretion to impose noninstitutional sentence alternatives and to
fix the minimum institutional term to be served upon conviction. In two specific instances the use of the indeterminate
sentence has been replaced by mandatory terms. Upon conviction of murder in the first degree, the statutorily imposed
sentence is life imprisonment, 8 unless certain courses of
conduct are found to have existed, in which case the death
sentence must be imposed. Those determined to be habitual
criminals must upon their fourth felony conviction also
receive a mandatory life sentence. 9
This use of mandatory sentences conflicts with the concept of individualization of sentences by limiting the range
of alternatives of the sentencing authority. It has been contended that the certainty of punishment which prompts the
adoption of them is largely illusory.70 The reduction of the

67.

68.

69.
70.

upon which the sentencing decision is made is properly inadmissible in
court and cannot be considered by the jury except at a separate hearing.
Sentencing by the judge alleviates the possibility that the jury may resolve
doubt as to guilt by compromising on a light sentence. Finally, the jury
cannot be aware of the programs and facilities available for the offender
which may best serve the needs of the offender and society.
The ABA STANDARDS-SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES, supra note 60, advocate
the judicial imposition of a maximum term up to the legislatively established maximum and a legislative grant of authority (not a requirement)
for the setting of a minimum term within carefully prescribed legislative
limits.
The MODEL PENAL CODE provides for the setting of maximum terms by law
for second and third degree felonies, while the court sets the maximum
term for first degree felonies. The minimum is set by the court within
fairly broad legislative perimeters.
The MODEL SENTENCING ACT, supra note 60, divides offenders into several
categories also. Upon a finding that the offender is dangerous to the
public, based on any one of a number of enumerated grounds, a term of
up to 30 years may be imposed. Conviction of second degree murder, arson,
forcible rape, armed robbery, and bombing carry terms of 10 years or
less, while life imprisonment is imposed for conviction of first degree
murder. All other felony offenders may be sentenced to the penitentiary
for a term of five years or less, or to a local correctional facility for up
to a year.
Wyo. STAT. § 6-54 (Supp. 1975). See also, Comment, Bastard or Legitimate
Child of Furman? An Analysis of Wyoming's New Capital Punishment
Law, 9 LAND & WATER L. REv. 209 (1974). Prior to 1973, Wyoming's first
degree murder statute allowed a greater degree of discretion in sentencing.
The current statute was enacted in response to Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972), which held discretionary imposition of the death penalty
unconstitutional.
WYo. STAT. § 6-10 (Supp. 1975).
See Cook, The "Bitch" Threatens, But Seldom Bites, 8 CREIGHTON L. REv.
893, 912 (1975).
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charge, the acquittal of the guilty, or the charging of an
unrelated offense, are devices which may be, and probably

are, used to circumvent the intent of these statutes. The
alernative to these subterfuges is the imposition of a sen-

tence which may be too harsh. 1
Nevertheless, the concept of short mandatory terms for
certain classes of offenses has recently gained increased
support. Evidence of the deterrent effect of certainty of
incarceration" recommends that any serious recodification
effort examine this alternative in light of that evidence, as

well as in light of the negative consequences of mandatory
sentences which have been discussed. Generally, the range

of sentencing alternatives available under Wyoming law is
conducive to individualization. District courts are possessed
of extensive probationary powers. Except for crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment,7 " and certain sex crimes,"
the courts may, after a conviction or plea of guilty, place
the defendant on probation, with or without imposing a fine, 5
for any term not to exceed the maximum term of imprisonment."5 If the defendant consents, 7 and it is his first felony
conviction, the court may, in most cases," suspend the imposition of sentence and grant parole for up to five years.
Although the court may revoke probation after a hearing 9 at any time during the term, recent case law defining
71. ABA STANDARDS-SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES, supra note 60, at 56.
72. See notes 15-1-7 and accompanying text, supra.
73. Wyo. STAT. § 7-318 (Supp. 1975); also WYO. R. ClIM. P. 33(e). Those
offenses which are punishable by life imprisonment or death and which
preclude probation are: Wyo. STAT. § 6-54 (Supp. 1975) murder in the
first degree; § 6-55 (1957) murder in the second degree; §§ 6-56, 6-57
(1957) murder by duel; § 6-59 (1957) kidnapping for ransom or robbery;
§ 6-61 (1957) child stealing or harboring; § 6-10 (Supp. 1975) habitual criminal-four convictions of a felony.
74. WYo. STAT. §§ 7-348 to -356 (Supp. 1975). There are eleven crimes to
which this limitation is applicable, ranging from rape to indecent exposure.
75. WYo. STAT. § 7-318 (Supp. 1975).
76. A strict reading of the statutory language does not impose a limit upon
the term of probation the court is authorized to impose. See WYO. STAT.
§ 7-321 (1957). However, in Hincklin v. State, 535 P.2d 743 (Wyo. 1975),
the supreme court concluded that probation was constructive confinement
and that the restraints of probation cannot exceed a period in excess of
the maximum term of imprisonment authorized by law.
77. WYo. STAT. § 7-317 (1957).
78. Parole prior to sentencing may be granted upon conviction of any felony
except: Wyo. STAT. § 6-54 (Supp. 1975) first degree murder; § 6-63(A)
(Supp. 1975) rape in the first degree; § 6-121 (1957) arson in the first
degree, when it involves arson of a human habitation in the actual
occupancy of a human being.
79. Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 33 (f).
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probation as "constructive confinement" indicates that any
combination of terms of probation and incarceration cannot
exceed the statutorily prescribed maximum sentence for the
violation in question.8"
Sentencing procedures utilized by Wyoming judges are
for the most part excellent and provide for a reasonable
amount of input from the offender. Normally, a pre-sentence
investigation will be made by the Department of Probation
and Parole.8 ' This report must be revealed to the defendant
or his counsel, and they must be given the opportunity to
comment on it. However, only when the court imposes probation upon a felony defendant must it receive and consider
such a report.8 2 The legislature should consider requiring the
compilation and consideration of such a report for all felony
offenses, and should provide for the resources to make this
possible. The information revealed during the guilt determination process is by its very nature entirely too limited
to provide an adequate basis for the sentencing decision.
In addition to the pre-sentence investigation, a sentencing hearing is held at which both sides may produce evidence
relevant to sentencing. The rules mandate that the court
afford counsel the opportunity to speak, and that the court
address the defendant personally, asking him if he wishes
to make a statement or present information in his own behalf.
The defendant is afforded the opportunity to present "information in mitigation of the punishment""3 and cross-examine.
80. Hicklin v. State, supra note 76. From the court's determination that
probation cannot exceed a period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment authorized by the statute violated, it can be inferred that any combination of probation and imprisonment cannot exceed that maximum. This
can be accomplished by virtue of Wyo. R. CRiM. P. 35, which allows the
court to reduce a previously imposed sentence upon revocation of probation.
In addition to its effect upon probation, Hicklin may also affect parole
powers of the Board of Parole. Specifically affected will be Section 9,
The Rules and Regulations, Board of Parole, State of Wyoming, ch. 5 (1974),
which allows the Board, when revoking parole, to determine whether or not
the parolee will have the time while on parole credited against his sentence.
81. This report will contain such information as the court may direct, including the defendant's prior criminal record and such information about his
financial condition and circumstances affecting his behavior that might
be helpful to the court in imposing sentence. Wyo. R. CRrM. P. 33(c) (2).
82. WYo. STAT. § 7-319 (Supp. 1975).
83. Wyo. R. CraM. P. 33(a) (1).
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He is not entitled
to notice of what testimony will be taken
4
at the hearing.1
Although it does not approach the rigors of due process,
the standard for review of sentencing procedure is somewhat
more stringent than that for review of the sentence itself.
Sentencing procedures in criminal cases will not be disturbed
on appeal unless there is a showing of an abuse of discretion,
procedural conduct prejudicial to the defendant, circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or
conduct which offends the public sense of fair play. 5
B. Appellate Review of Sentences
Appellate review of legal but allegedly excessive sentences focuses on the implementation of several worthwhile
objectives. It attempts to correct sentences which are excessive; promotes the rehabilitation of the offender by increasing the likelihood that he will believe that he has been dealt
with fairly;6 promotes respect for the law; encourages the
development of sentencing criteria by trial and appellate
courts by requiring the enunciation of findings and objectives ;7 and reduces the number of appeals which are brought
on frivolous grounds for the real purpose of challenging what
is seen as an excessive sentence.88
84.

85.
86.

87.
88.

Hicklin v. State, supra note 76, at 750. The court stated:
In regard to defendant's claim that he received no notice that
witnesses would be produced at the sentencing hearing, nowhere in
either the statutes of the state or the rules of criminal procedure
is there any requirement of notice that testimony will be produced
and taken at time of sentencing.
Id.
The morale of prisoners is closely tied to the process of rehabilitation. This
morale may be adversely affected if the offender harbors the belief that
he was harshly treated due to the idiosyncrasies of a particular judge. On
the other hand if sentencing strives to fit the defendant as well as the
crime, the concept of individualization of sentences must be adhered to,
and it is probably impossible to impress that concept on the prisoners'
mentalities. Prisoners tend to make shallow comparisons, and if individualization results in a sentence greater than that received by others
who have committed similar offenses, regardless of the number of prior
offenses or other circumstances, the prisoner may continue to feel maltreated. Note, Statutory Structure for Sentencing Felons to Prison, 60
COLUMBIA L. REV. 1134, 1168 (1960).
ABA STANDAs--APPELLATE RviEw OF SENTENCES, supra note 7, Standard 1.2.
Sobeloff, supra note 7, at 271.
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Iowa 9 , in 1860, became the first American 0 jurisdiction
to authorize appellate review of sentencing.9 At this writing, 25 states allow judicial review. Fourteen states have
specific statutory authority for such appeals, 2 while six
others have interpreted existing statutes to permit appellate
courts to "reverse, affirm, or modify" the judgment of a lower
court.9 One state utilizes a rule of court,94 while four others
rely upon court decisions to review sentences which are
within legal limits.9
89. IOWA CODE § 4925 (1860).
90. English law allowed for appellate review in misdemeanor cases as early as
1705, but it did not recognize the practice for felonies until 1907. See
Comment, Appellate Modification of Excessive Sentence, 46 IOWA L. REV.
159, 160 n.2 (1960); Regina v. Paty, 2 Salk 503, 91 Eng. Rep. 431 (K. B.
1705), as to misdemeanors, and Criminal Appeals Act, 190,7, 7 Edw. 7,
ch. 23, § 3, as to felonies.
91. The Iowa Code commissioners, in discussing one of their reasons for the
mandatory reporting of testimony in all criminal cases, stated:
[I]n order to remedy a mischief universally admitted, we believe,
to exist, viz: the inequality of punishment in cases of conviction
in the different judicial Districts . . . and for this the law as
it now stands affords no remedy, but the pardoning power, vested
in the Governor.... Is this as it ought to be? We think it is not ....
Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive
Sentences, 15 VAND. L. REy. 671, 675 (1962).
92. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120 (1972); ARiz. Rimv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1717(B)
(1956); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-409 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV.
§§ 51-195, -196 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2511.1 (1972); HAWAII RsV.
STAT. § 641-11 (Supp. 1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 793.18 (1975); MAINE REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2141 (Supp. 1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 28
(1975); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-2212 (1907); NEB. REv. STAT. § 292308 (1956); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 651:57-:59 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. CODE
CRIM. PRO. § 450.30 (1971); ORE. REv. STAT. § 138.050 (1959) (only after
plea of guilty or no contest).
Two states, Illinois and California, appear to have authorized such review,
but their courts have not interpreted the statutes as doing so. The California statute reads:
"the court may ... reduce the degree of the offense or the punishment imposed. . . ." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1260 (West Supp. 1975).
However, the California Supreme Court has interpreted this language to
allow sentence reduction only when the degree of offense is correspondingly
reduced. People v. Thomas, 230 P.2d 351 (Cal. 1951); People v. Odle, 230
P.2d 345 (Cal. 1951). The California court has even deferred to habeas
corpus proceedings rather than appellate review when the sentence is
illegal or unconstitutional. People v. Schueren, 111 Cal. Reptr. 129, 516
P.2d 833 (1973). Illinois appellate courts may "reduce the punishment
imposed by the court; . . ." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § G15(b) (1968).
However, Illinois appellate courts have been extremely hesitant to interfere with the "discretion of the trial court." People v. Felder, 22 Ill.
App. 3d 737, 317 N.E.2d 595 (1974). And, Virginia allows appellate review
of sentences to work gangs only. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-164 (1950).
93. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-2144 (1962); IDAHO CODE § 19-2821 (194-7); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 29-28-28 (1974); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953-07 (1973);
OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1066 (1971) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 41 (1962).
94. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 27.04-.06 (1969).
95. New Jersey: State v. Johnson. 170 A.2d 830, 836 (N.J. 1961), in which
the court offers detailed reasoning for reviewability of all discretionary
judgments of the trial court; Ohio: State v. Kasnett, 30 Ohio App. 2d '77,
283 N.E. 2d 636, 643 (1972), where the court relied upon the provisions
of the OHIO CONST. art, IV, § 3 (B) (1) (f), which grants the court of
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While Congress has specifically granted review authority
to military courts,99 no such authority has been granted the
federal appellate courts. Prior to 1891, circuit courts reviewed sentences on appeal, utilizing their statutory power to

"proceed to pronounce final sentence"97 when affirming a

conviction. This language was not retained in the Act of

1891 which created the courts of appeal.9

Although the

Supreme Court held that the powers vested in the federal

appellate courts by the pre-1891 Act were incorporated in
the new Act,9 9 the Ninth Circuit in Freeman v. United
States' held that the language omission had deprived the
appellate courts of sentence review authority. Thus began
an 85 year policy of federal nonreview of sentences. 1 ' This

policy of nonreview also ignores statutory authority to
"affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment,

decree, or order" of a lower court."' This language is similar
to that which the six state courts have depended upon to
authorize review.' °3
The language of Wyoming's rule... authorizing appeal
is substantially similar to that of several states which allow

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

102.
103.
104.

appeals original jurisdiction in any case on review as may be necessary
to its complete determination; Rhode Island: State v. Fortes, 330 A.2d
404, 411 (1975), relying on R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 8-1-12 (1974), granting
the supreme court the power of general supervision of all courts of inferior
jurisdiction to correct and prevent errors and abuses; and, Wisconsin: State
v. Tuttle, 21 Wis. 2d 147, 124 N.W. 2d 9, 16 (1963), in which the court
relied upon its power of discretionary reversal on appeal as outlined by
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 251.09 (1954).
10 U.S.C. §§ 864, 866 (1964).
Act of March 3, 18179, ch. 176, § 3, 20 Stat. 354.
Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
Ballew v. United States, 160 U.S. 187, 201-02 (1895).
243 F. 353, 357 (9th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 249 U.S. 600 (1919).
For a thorough opinion outlining the history of federal non-review, see
United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1952). In rejecting an
appeal of the Rosenberg's death sentence, the court concluded:
If there is one rule in the federal criminal practice which is firmly
established, it is the appellate court has no control over a sentence
which is within the limits allowed by a statute.
See also Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462, 467 (10th Cir. 1959); Cramer
v. Wise, 501 F.2d 959, 962 (5th Cir. 1974). It is interesting to note that
in Rosenberg, the court also rejected the argument that the death penalty
violated the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the Eighth Amendment. That argument has been recently accepted by the United States
Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972).
28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1958).
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-2144 (1962); IDAHO CODE § 19-2821 (1947); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 29-28-28 (1974); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.07 (1973);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1066 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 41 (1962).
Wyo. R. CPlM. P. 72(c).
Review by the Supreme Court.-A judgment rendered in whole or
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review." 5 Dicta in early Wyoming cases'0° indicated that
appellate review of legal but excessive sentences was available. However, recent decisions have firmly established the
Wyoming Supreme Court's adherence to nonreview. The court
has held to the rule that if the sentence is within the limits

it is exclusively within the discretion
set by the legislature,
0 7
of the trial court.
A primary objection of those who oppose appellate review
is that it would lead to a flood of sentence appeals. This has
not been found to be the case in those states in which it has
been authorized. 8 Sentence review may have the effect of
lowering the number of appeals brought upon the basis of
minor procedural defect, since the real reason for bringing
many of these appeals is to seek correction of what is per-

ceived to be an excessive sentence.'
Five states-Connecticut, Massachusetts, Montana, New

York and Alaska"-may have effectually limited the number of appeals by allowing their appellate courts to reduce
or increase sentences on appeal. Although some commenta-

tors once doubted the constitutionality of this practice,
question has now been favorably resolved."
105.

106.
107.
108.
109.

110.
111.
112.

1

that

2

in part, vacated or modified by the Supreme Court for errors
appearing on the record.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-2144 (1962); IDAHO CODE § 19-2821 (1947); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 29-28-28 (1974); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.07 (1973);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1066 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 41 (1962).
Seven other states have similar statutes in effect, but like Wyoming, they
have failed to interpret the "reverse, affirm, or modify" language as
authorizing review. See IND. CODE § 35-1-47-10 (1972); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 62-1716 (1963); MINN. STAT. § 605-05(1) (1971); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-107
(1962); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 34-51-20 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-42-3 (1953); WASH. SUP. CT. RULES, APPEALS, 1-16 (1974).
State v. Sorrentino, 36 Wyo. 11, 253 P. 14, 16 (1927); Bird v. State, 26
Wyo. 532, 536, 257 P. 2, 3 (1927).
In Bentley v. State, 502 P.2d 203, 209 (Wyo. 1972), the court affirmed the
five to 15 year sentence for manslaughter, which carries a maximum
penalty of 20 years.
Note, Statutory Struture for Sentencing Felons to Prison, 60 COLUMBIA
L. REV. 1134, 1166 (1960) ; see also Sobeloff, supra note 7, at 272.
Sobeloff, supra note 7, at 271. Judge Sobeloff contends that many appeals
are brought only because of the severity of the sentence. Appellate courts,
unable to tackle the real issue of sentence severity in a forthright manner,
may, and often do, in their endeavor to strike down the harsh penalty,
give the law the strained construction which is liable to work havoc in
succeeding cases.
Id.
Mueller, supra note 91, at 679.
The appellant in Walsh v. Picard, 446 F.2d 1209 (1971), asserted that
conditioning his sentence appeal on the state's right to ask for a sentence
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It is important to note that no jurisdiction that has
adopted the appellate review of legal but inappropriate sentences has ever rejected it. Although most of the American
jurisdictions which have adopted appellate review have had
little time to evaluate its effectiveness, others-Connecticut,
Maine and Maryland-have utilized it for almost 15 years.
Massachusetts has had appellate review for 30 years. Furthermore, appellate review has been an integral part of the
English criminal justice system for over 65 years.11
The American Bar Association's Project on Standards
for Criminal Justice devoted an entire volume to the appellate
review of sentences and called for its adoption in all jurisdictions. The manner in which it should be adopted is set
forth, but few of the 25 states which have adopted appellate
review have done so in strict conformity with the ABA recommendations. Seven states'14 authorize review by panels of
trial court judges rather than by appellate courts. The use
of these review panels appears to be the fastest growing
method of reviewing criminal sentences," ' and this method
is gaining support from at least the federal judiciary.1
Although the judge who imposed the sentence may not sit
in review, this method satisfies to some extent the feeling
that trial court judges are more attuned to sentencing than
are their appellate brethren. Sentence severity is used as a
prerequisite to appeal in several states. Only sentences in
excess of two years may be reviewed in Maryland, in excess
of five years in Georgia, and, when the minimum term imposed is at least three years higher than the minimum statuincrease constituted double jeopardy in that it unconstitutionally penalized
the defendant for taking the appeal. The court agreed that such a practice
might constitute double jeopardy if the defendant were faced with having
to choose between staying in jail under an erroneous sentence and seeking
an appeal with the possibility of sentence increase. However, the court
denied the appeal and distinguished the above situation by noting that in
the case at hand the defendant was not attacking the validity of his sentence but only its appropriateness. However, it is important to note that
any vindictiveness in sentencing imposed in the case being appealed or any
subsequent case based upon the appeal or a previous appeal would be
constntutionally impermissible. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711
(1969); McHoul v. Commonwealth, 312 N.E. 2d 539 (Mass. 19174).
113. ORLAND & TYLER, supra note 25, at '70.
114. Connecticut, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, and New
Hampshire.
115. Korbakes, supra note 3, at 116.
116. ORLAND & TYLER, supra note 25, at 80.
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tory term, in Colorado. The scope of the review and the power
to increase and decrease sentences are other devices which
states have used in tailoring their own systems.
It is a strange dichotomy that United States jurisdictions, which are known for their usual emphasis on individual liberty, are unique in the Western World in failing
to allow for review of sentences on appeal. 1 7 The American
system provides for appeals from excessive money judgments
yet fails to grant the same right when personal liberty is
at stake.11
C. The Sentencing Opinion and Policy
It has been suggested that the trial court should be
required to write a reasoned opinion to support the sentence
imposed."' This might afford trial judges an opportunity
to determine the considerations which are weighed by fellow
judges, and thus contribute to reducing disparity. Opinions
might foster more carefully considered sentences, since the
supporting opinion would not write easily for a sentence
which was too lenient or severe. However, the most pragmatic
reason for requiring sentencing opinions is to facilitate
appellate review.
At least five states provide for such opinions through
identical statutory provisions"' which allow the trial judge
to transmit to the review division a statement of his reasons
for imposing the sentence and require him to do so within
seven days if requested by the review division. Absent this
type of articulation the reviewing court can only surmise
how the sentence was determined.
This absence of articulation may cause problems other
than those concerning the appropriateness of the sentence.
117. ABA STANDARDS-APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES, supra note 7, at 2;
Note, Statutory Structures for Sentencing Felons to Prison, supra note
108, at 1166; THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE
ADMINISTRATION

Op JUSTICE,

TASK

FORCE REPORTS:

THE COURTS,

at 25

(1967).
118. Sobeloff, supra note 7, at 269.
119. Korbakes, Criminal Sentencing: Should the "Judge's Sound Discretion" Be
Explained? 59 JUDICATURE 185 (1975).
120. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-195 (1968); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2141
(1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 28B (1968); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 95-2501 (1947).
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In Miller v. United States,"1 a Tucker'22 problem case, the
appeal was on the ground that the judge had erroneously
taken into consideration three-fourths of the cases in Miller's
prior criminal record in which he had not been represented
by counsel. Judge Craven, who as a district judge had
imposed sentence on Miller, was assigned by the circuit court
on which he sat to hear Miller's petition to correct the sentence. It was thought by all that no one could know as well
as Judge Craven the factors that had entered into the formulation of the sentence imposed. However, upon hearing
the appeal, the judge stated:
But memory fails. I cannot reconstruct what I
thought about on May 12, 1966. The best I can
do is to rely upon habit; always in the course of ten
years as a trial judge (state and federal), I took
into account a defendant's prior criminal record
when I sentenced him. I can only assume that I
must have done so with respect to Miller.'
The reduction of disparity, the protection of the defendant's constitutional rights,1 2-4 and the facilitation of appellate
review all suggest that reasoned sentencing opinions should
be written by trial court judges.
The drafting of opinions by the review panels themselves
might also be helpful to trial court judges. In a survey of
the chief justices of five states which utilize sentence review
panels, only two of the four chief justices responding indicated that their panels had helped to reduce unexplained
disparity. However, these justices were the same two which
indicated that their panels wrote opinions which were published and made available to trial court judges.'25
121. 361 F. Supp. 825 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
122. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972). It is unconstitutional to
take into consideration when sentencing a prior conviction of a defendant
obtained when the defendant was unrepresented by counsel, was not
advised of his right to counsel, and did not intelligently waive his right
to counsel under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The defendant is entitled to resentencing when such convictions are taken into
consideration.
123. United States v. Miller, supra note 121, at 827.
124. See Berkowitz, The Constitutional Requirements for a Written Statement
of Reasons and Facts in Support of the Sentencing Decision: A Due
Process Proposal,60 IowA L. REv. 205 (1974).
125. Korbakes, supra note 119, at 191.
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D. Sentencing Councils
The concept of judicial sentencing councils is an attempt
to reduce disparity prior to the sentencing decision. The
concept has gained broad based support126 since its inception
in 1960... when the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan began to utilize the procedure.
The judges of that court meet weekly, 2 ' in rotating
panels of three, to discuss sentencing for current cases. Presentence reports are distributed to each judge one week in
advance. In addition, each judge fills out a "disposition study
sheet" on each of the approximately 12 cases per week, indicating his beliefs as to the important areas set forth in the
pre-sentence report, factors which should be controlling in
making a decision, and his specific recommendation as to
penalty.'29 These opinions are then shared at the next meeting of the council. The judge having jurisdiction retains the
responsibility for determining the sentence. The other judges
act in an advisory capacity only.
The Eastern Michigan experiment appears to be a complete success. Since the council's inception, the judges having
jurisdiction have elected to change their original sentence
in 41 percent of the cases. No judge has been immune from
130
change, and changes have not been solely in one direction.
Reports indicate that the council has had three general
effects. It has tended to level the sentences meted out by the
It has
participating judges and thus reduce disparity.'
ALTERNATIVES, sup'a note 60, Standard
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS
REPORT ON CORRECTIONS, Standard 5.13 (1973); and THE

126. See ABA STANDARDS-SENTENCING
7.1; NATIONAL
AND

GOALS,

COURTS, supra note 117, at 24.

127. Hosner, supra note 49, at 19.
128. One drawback to existing sentencing council procedure is that the judges
meet prior to the sentencing hearing. This has two negative effects: the
judges participating do not have the benefit of the information and
insights presented at the hearing; and the presiding judge may be tainted

by the views of his colleagues and the position he took at the council. These
factors may impair the judges ability to give open-minded consideration
to the information and arguments presented at the hearing.
129. Doyle, A Sentencing Council in Operation, 25 FED. PROBATION 29 (Sept.
1961).
130. Hosner, supra note 49, at 20.
131. Id. at 29. The author describes several cases in which the pre-council
recommendations of the individual judges were quite diverse. In a case
involving a defendant who filed false statements with postal authorities
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fostered the development of sound sentencing criteria among
the judges."3 2 And, a forum has been created for the exchange of experience in the legal and correctional fields.'
The applicability of judicial sentencing councils in rural
states such as Wyomng is limited by the remoteness of many
district judges." 4 Another negative aspect is that councils
alone do little to foster articulation of sentencing policies.
They tend to even out sentences and reduce disparity without
the production of a reasoned opinion as to why the original
sentencing decision may have been abandoned in favor of
a sentence closer to the mean. 3 5
E. Sentencing Institutes
Sentencing institutes are workshops which are convened
at two or three year intervals for the purpose of studying,
discussing and formulating objectives and criteria for sentencing."3 Their format may vary, but they are usually conducted as seminars, allowing as much time as possible for
discussion and questions. Nonjudicial personnel, such as
academicians, probation officers and other correctional personnel, may be invited to participate in order to gain the
broadest possible relevant input. Institutes are practical and
cost effective for every jurisdiction if they are planned to
coincide with judicial conferences or other gatherings.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

in connection with an application for employment, one judge recommended
probation, one an institutional sentence of three months, two others
six-month terms, while another preferred incarceration for 24 months.
Recommended sentences for an extortionist ranged from incarceration for
observation and study to institutional sentences of two years, four years
and ten years.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 21.
For statutory placement of Wyoming district court judges, see Wyo. STAT.
§ 5-41 (1957).
See Levin, supra note 1, for a description of the sentencing council in
operation.
The federal statute authorizing sentencing institutes, 28 U.S.C. § 334
(1970), sets forth the agenda for institutes. They may include:
(1) The development of standards for the content and utilization of presentence reports;
(2) the establishment of factors to be used in selecting cases for special
study and observation in prescribing diagnostic clinics;
(3) the determination of the importance of psychiatric, emotional, sociological and physiological factors involved in crime and their bearing
upon sentences;
(4) the discussion of special sentencing problems in unusual cases such as
treason, violation of public trust, subversion, or involving abnormal
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The utilization of sentencing institutes has been highly
recommended by virtually every recent study of the sentencing problem."3 7 At least two states3 8 and the federal judiciary
authorize the use of such institutes. The Governor's Planning
Committee on Criminal Administration" 9 has encouraged
their use in Wyoming whenever practical. "'
IV. CONCLUSION

The many factors which contribute to sentence disparity
may be distilled to four:
1. The variety of sentencing alternatives available to
the sentencing judge.
2. The disjunctive nature of the substantive criminal
law.
3. The lack of policies and standards to be applied.
4. The delegation of the sentencing responsibilities to
one individual.
The first of these provides an environment in which
disparity may exist, but also serves a legitimate purpose
if individualization of sentences is to remain an accepted
policy. The second may be remedied by conscious legislative

137.

138.

139.
140.

sexual behavior, addiction to drugs or alcohol, and mental or physical
handicaps;
(5) the formulation of sentencing principles and criteria which will assist
in promoting the equitable administration of the criminal laws of the
United States.
ABA STANDARDS--SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES, supra note 60, Standard
7.2; REPORT ON CORRECTIONS, supra note 126, Standard 5.12; THE COURTS,
supra note 117, at 22-23.
CAI. GOV'T CODE §§ 68551-52 (West. Supp. 1966); N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW
§ 234-A-2 (McKinney 1968). See also Proceedings of the First Sentencing
nstitute for Superio' Court Judges, 45 Cal. Reptr. (1965); First Philadelphia Judicial Sentencing Institute, 40 F.R.D. 399 (1966).
Wyo. STAT. §§ 9-276.18:11-:17 (Supp. 1975).
The Governor's Planning Committee on Criminal Administration adopted
the following draft goal and objectives for inclusion in its 1977 plan at a
January 13, 1976, meeting in Casper, Wyoming:
GOAL: Disparity in judicial decision-making should be reduced.
1. In 1977, develop recommendations for, and seek adoption of,
legislation providing for appellate review of sentences and
allowing the appellate court to increase, as well as decrease,
the sentence imposed.
2. Encourage within the judiciary in 1977 the use of sentencing
councils and sentencing institutes, where practical.
3. Encourage within the judiciary the development of a sentencing
manual for District Court judges.
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effort. The last two serve legitimate functions only in that,
at least in the short run, they are expedient and economical.
The safeguards which have been discussed focus on the
last three factors. They are not panaceas but have all tended
to reduce disparity in the jurisdictions which have implemented them. This alone does not insure their appropriateness for Wyoming. The physical nature of the state renders
impractical wide use of group sentencing involving trial
judges. The same is not true for statutory reform, appellate
review, sentencing opinions, and institutes. There are no
barriers to their importation, and the legislature and judiciary have a wealth of parallel experience on which to draw
should they choose to implement any of the safeguards.
As long as disparity exists, we are one step further
away from our ideal of the rule of law rather than men. It
is repugnant to our sense of justice that criminal penalties
be dependent upon purely fortuitous circumstances, such as
the prosecutor who charges the offender, or the judge before
whom he appears.
The adoption of these measures would reduce the likelihood of disparity while recognizing that sentencing is, and
should be, a judicial function. The object should be to create
a system where discretion is allowed necessary creative scope
while subjecting it to some degree of discipline. In this way,
what has become a blemish on the complexion of the judicial
process can be substantially reduced.
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